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Abstract: Feed-in tariff policies have been the most common and effective tool contributing towards
the important growth in photovoltaic solar energy in Europe. The purpose of this study is to
analyze their influence on the economic profitability of photovoltaic companies operating in the
most characteristic regions, Germany, Italy, France and Spain in the period 2008–2012. Variables
characterizing these companies are also included. Regarding the method, a static linear panel data
model is used. The results show how feed-in tariffs (FITs henceforth) have in fact had a significant
positive influence on the economic profitability of these companies. In addition, the findings suggest
that the expansion of these companies in terms of assets implies increased competition in the sector,
positively influencing their profitability given the economies of scale generated. Moreover, contrary
to expectations, photovoltaic companies with the highest leverage ratios are those with the largest
return on investment in the analyzed period, what could be a consequence of their higher possibilities
of investing the obtained external funds on PV technology.
Keywords: feed-in tariffs; panel data; photovoltaic; solar energy
1. Introduction
In recent years, a large number of policies have been approved throughout the world with the
aim of encouraging the use of energy from renewable sources (REs henceforth). One reason for this is
the need to reduce emissions of pollutant gases [1], an objective initially pursued with the approval of
the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, which committed the main industrialized countries to reduction of what
are called greenhouse gases. More specifically, in the European framework, this fact was reinforced by
the approval in 2001 of Directive 2001/77/EC, updated by Directive 2009/28/EC, creating a common
framework in the promotion of RE for countries belonging to the European Union. According to
Dusonchet and Telaretti [2] (p. 3297), the most recent update of this directive had the following
aims (‘ . . . targets are based on a flat rate increase in the share of renewables weighted by GDP and
modulated to take account of earlier development of these resources’ [1]): ‘the reduction of at least
20% of greenhouse gases, from 1990; the production from Renewable Energy Sources (RES) of 20% of
internal energy consumption; and the use of biofuels to cover at least 10% of the energy consumption
for transport.’
Another reason is that encouragement of RE would allow dependence on fossil fuels from other
countries to be reduced [1]. Along these lines, Lesser and Su [3] go further, declaring that policies aimed
at this objective would not only allow a reduction in energy dependence but would also contribute
towards creating a much more diversified energy mix as well as reducing exposure to fuel price
fluctuations. Furthermore, REs also allow increased innovation and the development of industrial
capabilities, as well as benefits for the regional and national economy [4].
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The types of policies intended to encourage REs are highly diverse (Table 1). Their aim being to
enable reduction in the costs of technologies allowing this type of energy to be obtained and to facilitate
their greater market penetration [5], each having strengths for producers of this kind of energy and society
in general, and also showing weaknesses depending on how they are incorporated in each country [6].
Table 1. Types of policies for the promotion of renewable energies.
Direct Indirect
Price-Driven Quantity-Driven
Regulatory
Investment
focused
Investment
incentives
Tendering system for
investment grant Environmental taxes
Tax credits Simplification ofauthorization procedures
Low interest/soft
loans
Connection charges,
balancing costs
Generation
based
(Fixed) FITs Tendering system forlong-term contracts
Fixed premium
system
Tradable green
certificate system
Voluntary
Investment
focused
Shareholder
programs Voluntary agreements
Contribution
programs
Generation
based Green tariffs
Source: Haas et al. [7].
However despite the existence of different types of policy, feed-in tariff (FIT) systems are the
most common tool in REs promotion in Europe; specifically, for the specific period between 2000 and
2012, the number of European countries applying FITs was increased, from 9–24 [8]. Furthermore,
these policies are an effective mechanism for the REs development; in this line, Haas et al. [7] hold that
compared with regions using tradable green certificates or other incentives, countries using FITs as a
means of developing renewable energies obtain greater efficiency. On the other hand, these policies
induce innovation on more costly energy technologies, such as solar power [5].
With reference to the importance of the FITs in the development of photovoltaic solar energy,
besides producing a significant development of REs in general, FITs have been the policy most used to
promote photovoltaic energy in Europe. According to the report published by the IEA [9], these policies
represent 61% of the total subsidies dedicated to photovoltaic in 2012 (Figure 1), with a proportion in
historical terms of 72% up to that year (Figure 2). Also, FITs have been the first policy employed in the
development of this type of energy [6,10,11].
Moreover, these policies have contributed to significant growth of photovoltaic energy in recent
years. Thus, Ragwitz et al. [8] argue that these policies have allowed important growth in photovoltaic
plants, the leading players being Germany and Spain, also facilitating the development of previously
unimportant markets such as Italy, France, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, and more
recently the United Kingdom. In addition, some authors [3,12] hold that FITs are the most effective
policies for the production of this type of energy, so enabling photovoltaic technology to have reached
a constant learning rate [13]. Furthermore, Campoccia et al. [6] hold that currently, the photovoltaic
market has a great potential in the contribution of REs to energy production (Table 2); specifically
the data provided by the EPIA’s 2014 report [14] show how photovoltaic energy had over 10 GW
connected to the grid at the end of 2013, contributing approximately 3% of European energy demand.
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Regarding the types of FITs systems, in general, they can be classified as a fixed FITs and premium
FITs, indepe dent or not, respectively, of electricity market prices. Each type of policy has various
advantages and disadvantages (see Couture et al. [15] for further analysis). However, fixed FITs have
been the policy preferred by European countries to support REs compared with premium FITs [15],
although Ragwitz et al. [8] assert that the use of the latter has n tably increased in recent years
(Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, the N therla ds, Slovakia, Slovenia and
Sp in), whet er as the main modality or i combin tion with other policies (Czech Republic, Germany,
l e i and Spain).
Fixed FITs guarante p yment of a particular tariff, the value of which is independent of the
electricity market price, generally out of it, for a particular period (ab ut 20 years). As a consequence
of this advantage, they make investors feel much more secure [3,16,17] because they reduce the risks
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associated with these investments [18,19], by giving stable cash flows in the future [20]. In addition,
more targeted subsidies, such as FITs, are needed to induce innovation on more costly energy
technologies, such as solar power [5]. More specifically, García-Álvarez et al. [21] analyze the success of
these incentives for German and Spanish markets, finding that in both markets FITs enables essential
development of REs, causing the increased employment, RDI and GDP, as well as reduced emission of
pollutant gases. The essential stability to these incentives has allowed the creation of many jobs and
economic opportunities in new sectors [22].
However, some of these policies’ inherent disadvantages have also been shown. On the one
hand, the fact that these tariffs are maintained for long periods of time may affect system costs,
making them too high [23,24]. Along with this line, Lesser and Su [3] maintain that this could cause
tariffs to deviate from market prices and, if high, could increase electricity prices, while if they were
low, would not achieve the objectives set. On the other hand, the study carried out by Dusonchet,
and Telaretti [2] shows how the effectiveness associated with FITs may be limited because sometimes
the tariffs are established for short periods of time or the procedures required by the administration
are too restrictive.
Ayoub and Yuji [16] (p. 194) list the main reasons explaining the success of FITs policies: ‘FIT
offers long-term security for investors through guaranteed and fixed tariffs for a long periods on
a relatively high level (high price per kilowatt hour); the existence of well-built financial subsidy
programs; regional investments towards economic and social welfare; technology-specific and location
dependent differentiation; stable governmental regulations.’
Premium FITs are those which depend on electricity market prices, guaranteeing a premium
(fixed or variable) or overprice above-market prices for renewable energy producers. According to
Couture et al. [15], the value of the premium established for these FITs is established so that either
(i) environmental and/social costs in renewable energy production or (ii) the costs associated with
energy generation by renewable means are taken into account.
The most significant advantage of these incentives is their market orientation [15], because part
of the total remuneration obtained by renewable energy generators is the price of electricity on the
market [21]; in fact, premium FITs allow the distortions occurring on the electricity market to be
reduced, so this modality is preferable to fixed FITs [1]. Additionally, Couture and Cagnon [19]
(p. 964) point out that while FITs allow a reduction in investment risk, premium FITs provide an
incentive for energy production at times when it is most needed, ‘which alleviate peak supply pressures
and improve the market integration of RE sources.’ In addition, linking the premium obtained to
electricity market prices prevents producers from making extraordinary profits [21], which in turn
allows system costs not to be increased unnecessarily. Furthermore, the use of premium FITs would
be more suitable for less mature technologies, according to the conclusions of the study carried out
by Canton and Johannesson [1]. In addition, in the future, this measure could contribute towards
improving integration of renewable energies in the electricity market, an increase in the use of this
system being observed precisely in recent years [8].
With regard to the disadvantage of the use of premiums, the first is that because of exposure
to the fluctuations of market prices increases the risks related to the investment [21]. In addition,
there being no guarantee of virtuous also increases these risks [15]. However, compared with market
price dependent premium FITs, FITs give investors greater security in terms of the investment [17,19],
mainly because of minimization of the risks associated with the investment and the certainty with
regard to the cash flow generated [19]. However, being a less efficient system regarding costs, it causes
costs per kWh produced to be higher on average than those of FITs [15].
Given this scenario, FITs monitoring is necessary. These support measures require continuous
supervision by governments so that they can be adapted correctly in a way that ensures the efficiency
of this system and consequently uncontrolled growth of it can be avoided [2]. So ‘well-managed FITs
have proven effective in stimulating deployment while providing fair but not excessive remuneration
to investors ( . . . )’ [25]. Haas et al. [7], analyzing the different types of policy for stimulation of RE
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in the European regions, found that good design of these policies does allow development of RE
with few implications for society in terms of costs. In addition, they declare that compared with
those regions which use tradable green certificates or other incentives, the country is using FITs as
an RE development measure of obtaining greater efficacy. Lesser and Su [3] hold that economically
efficient FITs would allow renewable energy producers to maximize their production without affecting
electricity market prices. Following this argument, Ragwitz et al. [8] indicate that FITs are effective as
well as efficient in terms of costs as long as they are well designed, indicating that the best elements put
into practice to control this aspect include measures such as gradual tariff reduction (with degressive
feed-in tariffs that anticipate technical progress, the profits resulting from technical progress can be
shared out more equitably by reducing the total cost borne by the community while granting a certain
surplus to producers [26].), the establishment of quotas, use of a staggered tariff or net-metering.
Through this last system, producers of renewable energy for self-consumption can discharge the excess
energy they do not need into the electricity network, energy demand greater than that generated by
the system in question being compensated for in subsequent electricity bills.
However, in some cases, the wrong design of these policies coupled with unwise revising them has
led to the adoption of damaging measures to the photovoltaic sector, in some cases clearly retroactive.
The report of the EPIA [27] gives details of how measures have been put into practice in certain
European countries, including Italy, France and Spain, which are damaging to the photovoltaic market
some of these measures being retroactive, moratoria, and unexpected reductions in levels of aid to this
sector, causing cancellation of new plant construction projects, as well as investors’ insecurity and the
loss of numerous jobs.
Regarding the current state of the research field, many authors [2,28–30] have analyzed the
profitability of photovoltaic installations in different policy scenarios and with different economic and
financing conditions, through well-known methods such as net present value (NPV) and internal rate
of return (IRR). However, it only found the study carried out by Jaraité and Kazukauskas [31] that
more examines explicitly the profitability of electricity sector companies, regardless of the technology
used, in markets applying tradable green certificates compared with those applying FITs, for the
period 2002–2010.
With reference to the purpose of the work and its significance, this study contributes to enlarging
the existing literature, because it is concentrated exclusively on photovoltaic companies in the way of
allowing the influence of FITs on their economic profitability (ROI) to be analyzed in greater detail,
this influence is expected to be positive, as is deduced from the aforementioned literature, also taking
the characteristics of each of the companies comprising the sample into account.
On the other hand, the countries examined are those which are most representative of the
European photovoltaic market: Germany, Italy, Spain and France; moreover, these countries have
already been the subject of study in numerous studies because of their great importance in the context
of the European photovoltaic market. In addition, this study has been conducted for the period
2008–2012. Those four regions and the period studied have been selected for the following reasons:
(a) These four countries had high growth rates in this period in terms of installed photovoltaic power
(Table 3), with accumulated capacities at the end of 2012 of 35.7, 17.9, 5.3 and 4.7 GW, respectively,
which means shares of each market in the total accumulated photovoltaic power in Europe of 46.06,
23.42, 7.42 and 5.77% for the same year (Table 4). Also, subsequent reductions in the photovoltaic
market occurred because of important cuts made to FITs; (b) FITs systems have been the prevailing
policy in each of these countries for the promotion of photovoltaic solar energy (see Winkel et al., [32]
for a more detailed analysis), contributing to a substantial growth in this type of renewable energy,
as we have already explained.
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Table 3. Evolution of the installed photovoltaic capacity for the regions under study.
Installed Capacity (MW)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Germany 1100 1500 3806 7408 7485 7604 3304
Italy 42 258 717 2321 9284 3759 1448
Spain 560 2511 17 369 372 332 118
France 11 46 219 719 1671 1115 613
Source: Author’s elaboration from EPIA [14,27,33,34].
Table 4. Installed photovoltaic capacity and cumulative (MW) in the European countries in 2012.
Country InstalledCapacity
Cumulative
Installed Capacity Country
Installed
Capacity
Cumulative
Installed Capacity
Austria 175 363 Lithuania 6 6
Belgium 683 2768 Luxembourg 0 30
Bulgaria 843 1010 Malta 4 16
Croatia 0 0 The Netherlands 195 360
Cyprus 7 17 Norway 0 0
Czech Republic 116 2087 Poland 4 7
Denmark 316 332 Portugal 70 242
Estonia 0 0 Romania 46 51
Finland 0 11 Slovakia 15 523
France 1115 4060 Slovenia 122 201
Germany 7604 32411 Spain 332 5221
Greece 912 1536 Sweden 8 22
Hungary 8 12 Switzerland 226 437
Ireland 0 3 Turkey 5 12
Italy 3759 16479 Ukraine 130 326
Latvia 0 1 United Kingdom 925 1829
Source: Author’s elaboration from EPIA [14].
2. Materials and Methods
In this section, first, hypothesis and the econometric model used are presented (Section 2.1).
Subsequently, the population of photovoltaic companies is determined, for the selection of the final
sample (Section 2.2). Finally, the variables used in the model are selected (Section 2.3).
2.1. Hypothesis and Model
In this part, the econometric model developed is determined. The economic profitability of
photovoltaic companies will be affected by FITs policies, this influence being different according to the
characteristics of the companies, including, therefore, controls representing these characteristics.
It should be mentioned that different individuals may behave differently because of unobservable
factors, there existing, therefore, an unobservable heterogeneousness, consequently making OLS
(Ordinary least squares) estimation biased and not consistent. This is the reason why a static linear
panel data model was estimated. Firstly, a fixed effect model was set up in which the explanatory
variables are correlated with the individual effects. Secondly, a model of random effects was built so
that there was no such correlation between the explanatory variables of the model and individual
effects, which consists of a fixed part and a random part.
This is the static linear panel data model used. The results section provides further explanation
about the selection of this model:
ROIit = α+ β1FITit + Xitγ+ ui + εit (1)
where ROIit is the economic profitability of company i at time t (dependent variable of the model); FITit
is the explanatory or independent variable; Xit represents the characteristics of photovoltaic companies;
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εit is the error or brand and disturbance term; and finally, in the random effects model, individual
effects are divided into a fixed part and another with random behavior (αi = α+ ui).
2.2. Population and Sample
To select the population, the Amadeus database was searched for companies producing
photovoltaic solar energy. First, those which had been assigned the NACE Rev. 2 3511 “electricity
production” code. This category includes the operation of electrical power generation facilities
including thermal, nuclear, hydroelectric, gas, diesel and renewable sources. However, this study
focused only on photovoltaic companies and so selected just those which included terms relating to
photovoltaic activity in their company name or description. Those established up to and including
2008 and residing in the regions under analysis (Germany, Italy, France and Spain) were then selected.
The final population was a total of 1069 companies, distributed by size (very large, large, medium and
small), following the Amadeus database size definitions. The company types in Amadeus as regards
size are: (a) Very large, companies meeting at least one of these criteria: operating revenue (turnover)
≥100 m EUR, total assets ≥200 m EUR, number of employees ≥1000, Listed company; (b) Large,
companies meeting at least one of these criteria: Operating revenue (turnover) ≥10 m EUR, total
assets ≥20 m EUR, number of employees ≥ 50, not related to any companies categorized as very large;
(c) medium sized, companies meeting at least one of these criteria: Operating revenue (turnover) ≥1 m
EUR, total assets ≥2 m EUR, number of employees ≥15, not related to any companies categorized
as large; (d) small, companies not included in any of the above categories. The final sample, selected
from the population by stratified sampling with proportional allocation, was 500 solar photovoltaic
companies, randomly chosen, distributed by country and company size, maintaining the distribution
of the selected initial population (Table 5). We decided to study this number of companies given the
data available, despite it being too large to be considered a sample.
Table 5. Final sample and distribution of photovoltaic companies.
Country
Germany Italy Spain France Total
SIZE
Very large 2 (0.4%) 2 (0.4%) 3 (0.6%) 1 (0.2%) 8 (1.6%)
Large 9 (1.8%) 7 (1.4%) 19 (3.8%) 1 (0.2%) 36 (7.2%)
Medium 11 (2.2%) 1 (0.2) 39 (7.8%) 6 (1.2%) 57 (11.4%)
Small 14 (2.8%) 4 (0.8%) 352 (70.4%) 29 (5.8%) 399 (79.8%)
TOTAL 36 (7.2%) 14 (2.8%) 413 (82.6%) 37 (7.4%) 500 (100%)
2.3. Variables Selected
Here the variables used in the study are presented, with their measurements and sources used
to obtain the data (Table 6). As we have already pointed out, the purpose is to analyze the influence
FITs have had on the financial profitability of companies dedicated to photovoltaic solar power
production. Furthermore, variables are included which characterize companies and also help to
explain said profitability.
Table 6. Summary of variables used, description, measurement unit and sources.
Variable Definition-Estimation Measurement Unit Source
ROI
Return on investment =
Earnings before interests and
taxes/Total assets
Ratio Amadeus
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Table 6. Cont.
Variable Definition-Estimation Measurement Unit Source
FIT Feed-in tariff = Averagefeed-in tariff €/MWh
CEER (Council of European
Energy Regulators) (2011,
2013, 2015)
GSE (Energy Services
Manager)
Del Rio y Mir-Artigues [35]
ASSETS Total assets (naturallogarithm) Thousands Euro Amadeus
LIQ Liquidity ratio = cash/currentliabilities Ratio Amadeus
LEV
Leverage ratio = (current
liabilities + non current
liabilities)/shareholder funds
Ratio Amadeus
AGE Age of company Number of years Amadeus
SECACT Secondary activity
Dummy variable (constructed)
one, if there is a secondary
activity; zero, if there is not a
secondary activity
Amadeus
COUNTRY 1 Germany
Dummy variables
(constructed) one, if the
company belongs to Germany;
zero, otherwise
Amadeus
COUNTRY 2 Italy
Dummy variables
(constructed) one, if the
company belongs to Italy;
zero, otherwise
Amadeus
COUNTRY 3 France
Dummy variables
(constructed) one, if the
company belongs to France;
zero, otherwise
Amadeus
COUNTRY 4 Spain
Dummy variables
(constructed) one, if the
company belongs to Spain;
zero, otherwise
Amadeus
The model’s dependent variable is return on investment ROIit, defined as the ratio between profit
before interest and taxes and the company’s total assets.
The model’s independent or explanatory variable is the FITs, FIT, the average incentive received
for photovoltaic production in each country (€/MWh), reflecting the efforts of governments when it
comes to promoting this type of energy. It is expected that this policy will have a positive, significant
effect on the ROI of photovoltaic companies. However, it should be mentioned that the FITs is the
same for companies of the same region, because of the difficulty of knowing beforehand the number of
facilities, type of technology, production and specific law under which each company adheres to the
regime, and consequently, the specific incentive perceived by each photovoltaic project.
With regard to the variables characterizing companies included in the sample, the first included
was ASSETS, (it has taken the natural logarithm of total assets to avoid the extreme values of this
variable distorting the results obtained, strategy previously used by [31].) because it could have a
relationship with the return obtained by companies [31,36]. Therefore, Jaraité and Kazukauskas [31]
holds that in companies’ growth processes, they can obtain greater profits if they take advantage
of economies of scale generated, so the relationship between profit and size would be positive,
being negative if diseconomies of scale were obtained [36].
Secondly, the variable liquidity (cash between current liabilities), LIQ, indicates a company’s
ability to meet its most immediate obligations. Thus, a company with high liquidity will be at lower
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risk of not being able to meet such obligations, while it may also indicate long-term investment
opportunities not taken advantage of [26].
The leverage ratio—total liabilities within equity—LEV, is also included. Goddard et al. [36] use a
variation of this ratio—non-current liabilities plus loans, within shareholders’ funds—and point out
that companies with a high leverage ratio, which indicates that outside resources are much higher than
own resources, tend to have less liquidity and, consequently fewer opportunities to make important
investments, which negatively affects their profitability.
In addition, the variable SECACT, “secondary activity”, is included in the model. The reason
for this inclusion is that a priori, the influence on companies’ profitability should be different if the
company exclusively dedicates its activity to photovoltaic production than if it is diversified among
other activities. This is a dummy variable with the value one activity and zero otherwise.
The company’s AGE is also included in our model because this variable allows companies’
years of experience in the market to be monitored [26]. In this sense, companies with more years
of experience are expected to have fewer problems in their capacity to go into debt, while younger
companies may benefit from more modern and therefore more efficient technologies [26], the latter
aspect being a very important factor for the photovoltaic sector specifically. ‘( . . . ) In technology- and
knowledge-based sectors in particular, strategies of innovation and product differentiation may enable
profitability to diverge from competitive norms for long [36].
The dummy COUNTRY variables are introduced as control variables given the differences
between the four study regions regarding CO2 emissions, energy dependence, PV capacity and
electricity consumption. Table 7 is a summary of descriptive statistics for this variable in the sample.
Germany, where the world’s first feed-in tariff was introduced in 2000, is the country in the sample with
the highest CO2 emissions and also with the highest PV capacity for the period 2008–2012. In addition,
it is one of the countries with the highest electricity consumption for the study period.
Table 7. Summary of descriptive statistics for emissions, consumption, capacity and dependence
by country.
Variable: CO2 Emissions
(Metric Tons Per Capita) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Germany 180 9.922 0.205 9.68 10.28
Italy 70 6.972 0.329 6.77 7.62
France 185 6.008 0.268 5.67 6.35
Spain 2065 6.402 0.515 5.93 7.35
Variable: Energy
Dependence (%) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Germany 180 0.609 0.005 0.616 0.601
Italy 70 0.828 0.022 0.793 0.857
France 185 0.494 0.011 0.48 0.509
Spain 2065 0.773 0.027 0.731 0.813
Variable: PV Capacity (MW) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Germany 180 5560.6 2491.232 1500 7604
Italy 70 3267.8 3276.110 258 9284
France 185 754 594.893 46 1671
Spain 2065 720.2 905.397 17 2511
Variable: Electricity
Consumption (kWh) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Germany 180 11,934.64 159.628 11,745.5 12184
Italy 70 5958.04 51.444 5880.4 6031
France 185 13,103.14 635.006 12,078.7 13888.2
Spain 2065 6323.68 227.284 5970.6 6544
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The main descriptive statistics for each of the variables included in the model are presented below
(Table 8). The number of observations per variable depends on the data available. As the Amadeus
database does not provide information on each variable for all years and companies, and as a result
there are missing values, it is necessary to work with unbalanced panel data.
Table 8. Summary of descriptive statistics for each variable.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ROI 1575 −0.0002 0.433 −6.03 1.68
FIT 2427 404.050 25.811 319.69 496.03
LOG ASSETS 1698 13.213 2.558 3.669 24.249
LIQ 1518 2.916 8.782 0 92.23
LEV 1665 −48.514 3056.552 −124,211.6 7538.28
AGE 2500 1.694 3.179 0 41
SECACT 2500 0.11 0.312 0 1
SIZE 2500 1.306 0.672 1 4
GERMANY 2500 0.072 0.258 0 1
ITALY 2500 0.028 0.650 0 1
FRANCE 2500 0.074 0.261 0 1
SPAIN 2500 0.826 0.379 0 1
Table 9 shows the average ROI for each country. It can be seen that photovoltaic companies
located in Germany were more profitable than in other countries for the period 2008–2012. Indeed,
confidence intervals show that, for Germany, we can be 95% confident that the mean ROI of all German
companies is between 0.068 and 0.216. This is the only country in which zero is not included in the
confidence interval for the mean ROI, and all values in the confidence interval are on the same side of
zero (all positive). On the contrary, for French companies, all values in the confidence interval are on
the negative side of zero (zero is not included in the confidence interval, either). For both, Italian and
Spanish companies, zero is included in the confidence interval. This means that, for most companies,
zero can not be rejected and the infinite number of other values in the interval can not be rejected either.
Table 9. Return on investment distribution by countries.
Variable: ROI Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (95% Conf. Interval)
Germany 45 0.142 0.247 −0.92 0.71 0.0680044 0.21644
Italy 59 0.034 0.182 −0.73 0.65 −0.0132175 0.081692
France 77 −0.037 0.091 −0.33 0.16 −0.0578205 −0.0164652
Spain 1394 −0.004 0.455 −6.03 1.68 −0.0282543 0.0196316
Table 10 shows the average ROI by firm size. It can be seen that photovoltaic companies with the
smaller size, the vast majority in this study, were the less profitable for the period 2008–2012. Indeed,
Large companies have the higher ROI, and they are the only ones in which zero is not included in the
confidence interval for the mean ROI, and all values in such interval are on the positive side of zero.
Table 10. Return on investment distribution by size.
Variable: ROI Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (95% Conf. Interval)
Very large 4 32 0.033 0.101 −0.34 0.34 −0.0033961 0.0696461
Large 3 143 0.044 0.131 −0.92 0.58 0.0229531 0.0665574
Medium 2 204 −0.015 0.618 −6.03 0.71 −0.1012148 0.0694501
Small 1 1196 −0.003 0.424 −5.93 1.68 −0.0279617 0.0201524
However, despite Germany having an average ROI higher than that of other countries comprising
the sample, the following table shows how that country has a FIT lower on average than the
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other countries during the study period (Table 11). Nevertheless, despite having a lower incentive,
that country underwent extraordinary growth rates compared with the rest; specifically, the installed
photovoltaic power in Germany rose from 3806 to 7408 MW in the period 2009–2010, with an
accumulated power of 35.7 GW at the end of 2012, making it the undisputed leader in Europe.
One explanation for this fact can be found in Dusonchet and Telaretti [2] (p. 990), who hold that
it was all possible due to ‘( . . . ) the confidence of stakeholders, the long-term stability of support
mechanisms, simplified authorization and permission procedures, and flourishing national industry.’
Table 11. Average FITs values for each country (€/MWh).
Variable: FIT Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Germany 144 368.117 34.704 319.69 411.04
Italy 70 401.174 44.056 335.6 457.29
France 148 468.727 19.167 449.97 496.03
Spain 2065 402.018 14.633 388.71 424.6
3. Results
After estimating the linear panel data model presented in Section 2.1, in this section, we show the
results obtained for the fixed effects and the random effects models (Tables 12 and 13).
Table 12. Results for the fixed effects model.
ROI Coef. Std. Err. z p > |z| (95% Conf. Interval)
FIT 0.1729619 0.0218852 7.90 0.000 0.1300162 0.2159075
ASSETS 0.2892791 0.0768426 3.76 0.000 0.1384898 0.4400685
LIQ 0.0781706 0.0372339 2.10 0.036 0.005106 0.1512351
LEV 0.170297 0.0365785 4.66 0.000 0.0985185 0.2420756
AGE (omitted *)
SECACT (omitted *)
COUNTRY dummies (omitted *)
_cons 0.6304124 0.1916555 3.29 0.001 0.2543242 1.006501
Number of obs = 1442; Number of groups = 427; F (4, 1011) = 26.69; Prob > F = 0.0000. * Variables omitted in the
fixed effect model estimation because they are time-invariant regressors. Sigma_u: 0.44318566; sigma_e: 0.57860074;
rho: 0.36975971. F test that all u_i = 0: F (426, 1011) = 1.72 Prob > F = 0.0000.
Table 13. Results for the random effects model.
ROI Coef. Std. Err. z p > |z| (95% Conf. Interval)
FIT 0.1939975 0.0212704 9.12 0.000 0.1523083 0.2356868
ASSETS 0.2568712 0.0374168 6.87 0.000 0.1835356 0.3302067
LIQ 0.1232263 0.0260231 4.74 0.000 0.072222 0.1742305
LEV 0.1185007 0.0255629 4.64 0.000 0.0683985 0.168603
AGE 0.0149548 0.0064908 2.30 0.021 0.0022331 0.0276765
SECACT −0.1169538 0.0720403 −1.62 0.104 −0.2581501 0.0242425
GERMANY 0.4205021 0.1473035 2.85 0.004 0.1317926 0.7092117
ITALY −0.1440266 0.1179864 −1.22 0.222 −0.3752758 0.0872225
FRANCE −0.2034844 0.3134964 −0.65 0.516 −0.817926 0.4109572
SPAIN (omitted)
_cons 0.6500094 0.1087591 5.98 0.000 0.4368456 0.8631733
Sigma_u: 0.25055642; sigma_e: 0.57860074; rho: 0.15791061 (fraction of variance due to u_i). Number of obs = 1442;
Number of groups = 427; Wald chi2 (10) = 223.39; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000.
In the fixed effect model estimation (Table 12), the F test shows that the Prob > F is lower than 0.05
(Prob > F = 0.000). Therefore, all the coefficients in the model are different from zero, what justifies an
analysis taking into consideration the individual effects, using panel data.
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The three variables omitted in the fixed effects model estimation, AGE, SECACT, and COUNTRY
dummies are variables which do not vary over time; they are constant for each company. These
time-invariant characteristics of the individuals are perfectly collinear with the companies in
the sample.
In order to detect possible multicollinearity problems, we applied an ex-post and an ex-ante
method. The first one consisted of calculating the correlation matrix for all variables in the study,
and it showed that this correlation is not very high (<0.55). The ex-post method applied to detect
multicollinearity consisted of testing for the variance inflation factors (VIF). This test also showed the
absence of multicollinearity problems (mean VIF: 1.20).
In the random effects model estimation (Table 13), the test (F) to see whether all the model
coefficients are different from zero indicates that the model is useful because Prob > chi2 < 0.05 (0.0000).
Both regressions (Tables 12 and 13) show that the main explanatory variable FIT is positive
and significant. This result confirms our initial hypothesis, based on previous literature, that these
incentives have positively influenced the profitability of photovoltaic companies. The coefficients
of the regressors indicate how much the dependent variable in the models (ROI) changes when the
explanatory variable increases by one unit.
In addition, all the variables characterizing photovoltaic companies, ASSETS, LIQUIDITY and
LEVERAGE, are also positive and significant in both models. Firstly the positive relationship between
return on investment and total assets suggests that larger companies may take advantage of the
economies of scale generated and, consequently, obtain greater profits [31,36]. As to the positive
relationship between liquidity ratio and return on investment, this indicates that the greater ability of
companies with higher liquidity to take out loans with financial institutions and conduct investment
projects [31] makes them more profitable. Regarding leverage, contrary to expectations, its positive
relationship with ROI suggests that companies more able to borrow funds for investing in PV
technology, and so with a higher level of debt, are those with most return on investment in the
period analyzed.
The variables AGE and dummy COUNTRY 1, Germany—time-invariant variables omitted in the
fixed-effects model estimation—are positive and significant in the random model. One explanation for
this, based on previous literature, is that companies with longer experience have fewer restrictions on
borrowing capacity, and so their ability to invest is higher, increasing their profitability. Regarding the
variable COUNTRY 1, a dummy equal to 1 if the company belongs to Germany and zero otherwise,
its positive relationship with ROI shows that German PV companies are generally more profitable for
the period 2001–2012.
The other variables, SECACT and other dummy COUNTRY, are not significant in any model.
It was expected that PV companies with a secondary activity would see an increase in profitability
with the diversification of their business to reduce the risk of photovoltaic market saturation,
and consequently would avoid any negative impact on profitability. Yet this variable is not significant
in any model.
Time-constant variables were omitted in the fixed effects model because they are collinear with
the companies. Indeed, fixed effects models cannot be used to investigate time-invariant causes of
the dependent variable. Nevertheless, although these variables have been included in the random
effects model, as shown in Table 13, most of them are not significant. Given this fact, we decided to
base the selection of one of these models on the Haussmann test results. According to the Hausman
test, the null hypothesis not being rejected, the use of a fixed effects model was more appropriate.
The results for this test (Prob > chi2 = 0.0003) showed we should eventually choose the fixed effects
model (Table 14).
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Table 14. Hausman Test results.
Coefficients (b-B) Sqrt Diag (v_b-v_B)
(b) Fe (B) Re Difference S.E.
FIT 0.1729619 0.1913975 −0.0210357 0.0051509
ASSETS 0.2892791 0.2568712 0.032408 0.0671176
LIQ 0.0781706 0.1232263 −0.0450557 0.0266301
LEV 0.170297 0.1185007 0.0517963 0.0261635
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg; B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained
from xtreg; Test: Ho, difference in coefficients not systematic; chi2 (4) = (b-B)′[(V_b-V_B)ˆ(-1)](b-B) = 20.91;
Prob > chi2 = 0.0003.
After the Haussmann test, we perform a modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in
the fixed effect model, implemented in Stata by Christopher Baum [37]. The results (p < 0.05) indicate
that we must reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity.
We also need to test for serial correlation which is very likely to appear in an individual-effects
model. We use a test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel-data model
implemented by David Drukker [37]. The probability obtained for our fixed effect model is 0.0616
(Ho: no first-order autocorrelation; F (1, 245) = 3.527; Prob > F = 0.0616). Therefore, at a 5% level of
significance, we have enough statistical evidence for not to reject the null hypothesis. This indicates
that the errors are not auto correlated.
In order to face the identified heteroscedasticity problem in our fixed-effect model to avoid biased
statistical results, we run a fixed-effects (within) regression with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors [37]
(Table 15).
Table 15. Fixed-effect (within) regression with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors.
ROI Coef. Drisc/Kraay Std. Err. t p > |t| (95% Conf. Interval)
FIT 0.1729619 0.0271206 6.38 0.000 0.119655 0.2262687
ASSETS 0.2892791 0.081652 3.54 0.000 0.1287882 0.4497701
LIQ 0.0781706 0.0645753 1.21 0.227 −0.0487553 0.2050964
LEV 0.170297 0.0236888 7.19 0.000 0.1237355 0.2168586
_cons 0.6304124 0.14659 4.30 0.000 0.3422827 0.9185421
Number of obs = 1442; Number of groups = 427 F (4, 426) = 28.71; Prob > F = 0.0000; within R-squared = 0.0955.
The resulted econometric model, showed below, confirms the positive correlation between the
feed-in tariff, the main treatment variable, and the ROI. The explanatory variables included in the
model as control ones, the level of assets and the level of leverage, remain significant and positively
correlated with the ROI.
ROI = 0.6304 + 0.1729 FIT + 0.2892 ASSETS + 0.1702 LEVERAGE
4. Discussion
Extensive previous literature shows how FITs policies have been fundamental and effective
in the development of renewable energies in Europe. To concentrate on the photovoltaic sector,
FITs have allowed an extraordinary growth in the installed photovoltaic power in European countries.
Numerous authors have published studies dealing with the effect of these policies on the profitability
of production facilities of this type of energy, although previous empirical studies analyzing their effect
on the profitability of companies dedicated to photovoltaic production have not been found. For this
reason, the objective of our study was to analyze the influence of FITs on the financial profitability
of the companies carrying out their activity in the four most representative photovoltaic markets
(Germany, Italy, France and Spain), more specifically in the period 2008–2012.
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To achieve our objective, a static linear panel data model was applied. Both, the fixed and the
random effects models were estimated, and the Hausman test confirmed the suitability of the first one.
The variables considered were the average FIT for each country and year, and variables describing
different characteristics of the companies.
The fixed effects model’s results confirm the positive, significant influence of FITs policies on the
profitability of photovoltaic companies, which had been deduced from a prior review of the existing
literature. With regard to the company variables, total assets and leverage turned out to be determinant
in explanation of ROI.
Since the introduction of the first FITs in Germany in the early 21st century, FITs have been
introduced in many other countries to give certainty to investors regarding the return on their
investment and to promote photovoltaic energy generation. Increasing this renewable source of
energy generation would reduce greenhouse gas emissions, a major objective for countries worldwide.
Table 7 shows that Germany is the country in the sample with the highest level of CO2 emissions and
also with the highest PV capacity.
During the study period (2008–2012), PV technology was far more expensive than today, especially
in countries such as Spain, given the lack of experience and the need for research and development.
The main problem in this country was the sudden drop in the feed-in tariff, which in some cases
led to major problems in paying off investors’ financial debts. But currently it is possible to get an
appropriate return on investment in PV energy generation despite the fall in the FIT per kWh, because
the cost of the technology installed has also fallen.
Regarding the policy implications of these incentives, Cointe and Nadaï [38] analyze the historical
trajectory of FITs as an instrument for the promotion of renewable energy in Europe. They look at
the emergence and transformations of FITs as part of the policy arsenal developed to encourage the
creation of markets for such energy. In our opinion, there is a mismatch between EU energy policy and
liberalization as a key aim in the EU, and Member States’ interests and ways of regulating incentives
for renewable energy generation. Accordingly we agree with the conclusion of [38] that there are two
interwoven storylines: that of the European Commission’s perspective on renewable energy policy,
and that of the actual, more bottom-up emergence and evolution of FITs in Member States. They also
highlight the intersection between environmental objectives, technological change and the ambition to
liberalize the internal electricity market.
The variables in our study positively influencing ROI from 2008 to 2012, i.e., FITs, size (level
of assets), and level of leverage, were the same ones which, shortly afterwards, led to problems
for investors due to inappropriate government planning and policymaking. Companies with more
experience were less affected by the sudden cuts in some countries.
With better policymaking, it would have been possible to avoid the problems detected in some
countries, such as uncontrolled growth of PV installations or increase in electrical system costs [2,25].
Finally, with regard to future research, firstly, the possible continuation of profitability could be
analyzed using a dynamic model. Secondly, the existing empirical literature could be enlarged upon by
analyzing the factors determining the adoption of FIT policies, and which might contribute to efficient
or optimum policy design.
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